Superpower rivalry and geopolitics in Trump 2.0

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Robin Pomeroy, host, Radio Davos: I'm Robin Pomeroy, host of Radio Davos from the World Economic Forum.

Mina Al-Oraibi, Editor in Chief, The National: And I'm Mina Al-Oraibi, editor in chief of The National here in Abu Dhabi.

Robin Pomeroy: And we've teamed up for this co-production airing on both the World Economic Forum's Radio Davos and The National's Beyond the Headlines podcasts.

Mina Al-Oraibi: We're now filming in Dubai, and in this special episode, we'll explore how the conversations taking place at the World Economic Forum connect to the stories shaping the Middle East and the world. At a time of great change, including new developments since the second term of Donald Trump's presidency, we'll look at how the global balance of power has shifted and explore how countries can work together on global issues like security, climate, energy transition, and much more.

Robin Pomeroy: And we'll be looking at the growing tensions between the US and China and ask whether that rivalry is now the main driving force shaping global affairs, and where it could be headed next.

To discuss that, Mina and I have invited a special guest into the studio here in Dubai. Her name is Dr. Lynn Kuok. She's from the Brookings Institution, where she holds the Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia Studies. It's great to have you here

Robin Pomeroy: We're almost a year into 2.0. Is the world a different place now than it was twelve months ago because of that?

Lynn Kuok, Lee Kuan Yew Chair in Southeast Asia Studies, Brookings Institution: I think there's no doubt that the world is in a different place. Not necessarily all because of the new US administration, but certainly it has exacerbated many of the existing trends.

I think we've taken seen a decisive turn in the global order, an order less bound by the rule of law, less anchored in alliances that the US has led, and by and large, more unpredictable as balances of power shift.

On the erosion of the rule of law, what we've seen is the US impose sweeping tariffs around the world, often on rather dubious and shifting grounds. And this, in a sense, has undermined the rule of law and added to already the rule of law, which was already being challenged by China's actions in the South China Sea and Russia's invasion of Ukraine. But those, of course, are not the only actions that have undermined the rule of law, but they're certainly some of the major ones.

On US alliances, I think that has certainly been shaken. Earlier this year, we saw the US administration question its commitments to Europe. And I think that has left many countries in Europe wondering about what US commitments mean for its future.

I think at the moment the NATO summit over the summer in The Hague has helped to satisfy the United States for the moment. But I think the long-term questions about US reliability in the future remain.

And that also, of course, raises questions in my part of the world or in the part of the world that I study most closely, in Asia, about what US security commitments in Asia mean.

And this is worrying, of course, because it also opens up old questions, which we don't hear very much about, but nonetheless should be examined.

And and so and what happens when the US nuclear umbrella no longer exists?Is it self-help for all the countries in the region? Does South Korea begin developing its own indigenous nuclear capabilities? What does that mean for Japan, Taiwan, etc.? so I think all this is leading to a very much more unstable world.

And finally, I think we're looking at shifting or further shifting in the balance of power. Countries, as a result of these security but also the economic uncertainties that have been cast over the the global trading as well as security architecture, I think they have sought to hedge in terms of seeking other economic and security partners.

But you know, some partners just happen to have lots of economic clout and diplomatic influence, and we might well see China filling the gap that the US has left.

So I think we are seeing quite a different world order as we move forward. Not all of it started with the Trump administration, but certainly it has reinforced many of these trends.

Robin Pomeroy: Did any of it surprise you, because Trump campaigned, we knew he was going to impose tariffs. It shouldn't have come as a surprise to anyone. I think shifting alliances may also have been on the cards before. Has any of it in the last nine months really surprised anyone, do you think?

Lynn Kuok: I think it surprised lots of people. I think they were expecting tariffs, perhaps hoping for the best. But you know, tariffs, I think, there are tariffs and then there are global tariffs of a magnitude unseen before. I mean, if we look at some of the tariffs that have been imposed on Southeast Asia on say solar panels, it's tariffs of 3,500%.

So these are alarming tariffs and it's it's it it wasn't even necessarily about rebalancing trade imbalances because countries like Singapore, for instance, which has a trade deficit with the United States, actually saw the imposition of tariffs as well.

So it shouldn't have come as a surprise, but I think the scale and the magnitude of what was imposed did come as a surprise.

And in terms of shifting alliances, yes, the writing was on the wall, but I think you know one often hears about how sometimes countries need a crisis before they respond, and I think here was Donald Trump presenting a crisis to regions like Europe, but also question marks for regions like Asia.

Mina Al-Oraibi: But to what extent was the surprise tied into the manner in which it was done and the scale, as you said?

There was a sense that tariffs were on the cards and the economic agreements that people had taken for granted were upended in the first Trump administration, but it was almost now that the Trump administration and those that worked with the president knew how to implement these things in a second term. So was it the speed and the scale that also threw people?

Lynn Kuok: Certainly it was the speed and the scale that threw people off. I mean, if we look at the US withdrawal of aid as well in the region, countries need to figure out how to allocate scarce resources. However, the withdrawal of aid programmes in regions from Asia to Africa, I think it was certainly the speed at which at which it happened that was alarming because countries were not able to respond to this sudden withdrawal of aid. So yes, speed was certainly an issue.

Robin Pomeroy: And has the world's response to Trump 2.0 come into effect yet? Or are countries and regions still working on it? You mentioned that alliances will change. Have we really seen that starting to happen yet, or is it something you imagine will start happening over the next two or three years?

Lynn Kuok: Well, I was recently in Asia for a few weeks and I travelled the region. I was in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia as well as Thailand. And what was very clear was that the US reputation had been badly hit, most of all because of the tariffs, but also because of the withdrawal of aid. And so the reputational hit was clear.

What was less clear was what countries were going to do about it and whether or not their foreign and defence policies would change as a result of the US actions.

And I think that part to me was not yet clear, that there has been a change in in security or strategic alignment. Nonetheless I think with economic with economic flows and changes in economic alignment, I think it will be very difficult for security and military policy not to follow in the medium to longer run.

So I was actually at the Indo Pacific Chiefs of Defence Conference in Thailand and I asked about this exact point, whether or not the broader economic and political context would hurt military ties, which so far thankfully appear to be very much insulated from this these broader turbulences. I think military ties across the Indo Pacific have been quite strong and been quite stable. And I think one chief of defence from the region actually talked about how it was very difficult in the light of, you know, what was happening in the United States, in the light of, you know, how some of its economic actions have certainly hurt the region. It would be very difficult in the medium to longer term for you know longer term defence and security policy not to change as well.

Robin Pomeroy: Touring those countries, Southeast Asia, how are they seeing this? Do they see global affairs now as dominated by this rivalry, United States and China? Or are they seeing this as the United States has suddenly pivoted and is taking a much different route? Do you get a feeling of where they see things are going now, what they're worried about now?

Lynn Kuok: I think the region has always been worried about US-China rivalry and what it meant for the region, the instability that it introduced to the region.

The region had problems with China, not least in the South China Sea, but in a sense that was secondary to its worries about US-China rivalry and its knock-on effects for the region.

But that said, there are other influences on regional developments, geopolitics, more broader geopolitics as well. And we must not forget that not everything originates or is caused by US-China rivalry.

So for instance, if we look at the South China Sea, this was in fact very much a regional dispute that stemmed from China's expansionist claims in the South China Sea, seeking to assert claims over its neighbours' exclusive economic zone.

But since then, of course, it's become more of a global issue as well, and that has implications for how that particular issue is resolved and managed as well.

And if we look at disputes or conflicts in the region, we recently we saw the renewal of conflict between Thailand and Cambodia on their border. That was very much independent of US-China rivalry.

So there are plenty of disputes that have independent causes, but I think what we can say with clarity is that the US-China rivalry is causing many independent problems as well. It's exacerbating existing problems, and it's making the resolution of global challenges far more difficult.

So certainly I think you know, US-China rivalry is a force, unfortunately mostly a force that has not been positive.

I think it's also possible though, that, in a more optimistic world, in a more creative world, in a more idealistic world, where that rivalry can be a rivalry to peace.

And you know, we saw a glimmer of hope in this respect recently. Perhaps it was unnoticed by many, but this Thailand-Cambodia border dispute, we saw Trump actually use tariffs or the threat of increased terrorism both these countries as a threat to bring parties to the negotiating table, and that opened the door for ceasefire negotiations, which was reached eventually. And China, not to be outdone, actually redoubled efforts in respect of Cambodia and Thailand, and China of course has close ties with both these countries, has leverage over these countries, and China called for a separate meeting, I believe it was in Shanghai, between these two countries, a trilateral between China, Thailand and Cambodia, where it insisted that both countries also adhere to the ceasefire arrangements.

So perhaps not all of it is gloom and doom, and perhaps we might have rivalry towards peace confusions and peace deals.

Robin Pomeroy: That's interesting. So it's kind of a competitive, the competition can actually lead to good things in that way. Could I ask one more follow-up on that issue before, Mina

Mina Al-Oraibi: I think the negotiations and the ceasefire also stimulated the Middle East.

Mina Al-Oraibi: Oh really?

Robin Pomeroy: And so I think actually it's it's such an important point that I don't want us to move on from.

Robin Pomeroy: Okay, great.

Mina Al-Oraibi: Because you can say what you want about Donald Trump, but there is a sense that the US now takes action. And some of the action can be, you know, negative or or can cause adverse effects, but there's also a positive or an action that creates momentum that forces change on issues that need resolution.

And of course, you know, we've had the terrible war in Gaza and the the the the continued of course occupation of Palestine, but still the fact that you had the US president at first don't want to get involved, but when he decided he wants to get involved, actually could push and bring people around the table because he wanted to take that action.

And it did push other countries. So suddenly France and Saudi Arabia were working more closely together because there was an American action and others wanted to get ahead of it.

So in a way it's an impetus, and I wanted to ask you about that impetus, coupled with what you were saying about of course that could be a positive dynamic for competition for influence. How do you see that going forward? You know, if you are advising, be it any of the countries that are not China or the US, seeing this dynamic, how would you advise them to get involved in either ceasefire negotiations or a change in the geopolitical landscape?

Lynn Kuok: First of all, I guess there needs to be an openmindedness to how countries perceive the United States.

Not everything that this administration has does is necessarily a bad thing, or even if bad, I think good can be spun out of it.

So I think that openness has first to be there.

Second, I think in order to propel parties to ceasefire negotiations, etcetera, other parties, other countries should be willing to put effort into it. And it doesn't necessarily need to be the opening gambit, but perhaps, you know, if the US administration is easily distractable after concluding a ceasefire deal, then perhaps other countries then can, or regional organisations, can then step in to implement the deal or to ensure that that deal is adhered to.

So I think there are various steps to take or various means by which one can go about reinforcing some of this positive developments.

Robin Pomeroy: And while we're talking positives then, are there any areas where it's feasible that we'll see a rapprochement on some issues perhaps between China and the US?

Lynn Kuok: Well, that one's a more difficult issue. I mean, the issue of the US-China, I think how that relationship goes is still to be determined.

There's a saying that that goes the devil alone knows the mind of man. But I think even the devil would be scratching his head on the US-China rivalry. I don't think it's clear yet where it's going.

That said, I think there are several factors that we should be watching out for.

The first would be whether or not a trade deal or an economic deal between the United States and China is concluded that President Trump can point to and be satisfied by. If that happens, we are likely to see relations stabilise. But if not, I think what we will see, however, is the hawks in the US administration given free reign, as they were given in the first Trump administration, and that's when we really saw US-China relations deteriorate after the breaking down of the phase one trade deal in the first Trump term.

The second factor or issue that I would be looking out for is the framing of the US National Defense Strategy, which is being worked on but has not been released. There have been reports about how that's going to be focused more on the US homeland as well as the Western hemisphere. And some have read that as it giving more of a free pass to China.

The Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth, however, I think provides a more nuanced position on that. I think what he did say was the focus would be on the homeland and the Western Hemisphere, but it's not clear that that focus on the homeland and the Western Hemisphere means the US taking its eye off the Chinese ball because I think he described China as the pacing threat for the United States.

And if we look at what the US Indo-Pacific commander has talked about, he has talked about the homeland being the Pacific.

So, you know, I think, you know, how the US national defence strategy is framed matters, but perhaps even if it's framed as a focus on the homeland and the Western Hemisphere, we might still see tensions with China remain. It might be better, but I think those tensions will remain.

Third, I think what we need to be looking out for is China itself. Often we look at what the US does, what this administration does. But there's also the issue of China, its actions and its perceptions of threat. And I think that's a neglected issue that we should look at more closely as well.

China's activities, its grey zone activities in particular, risk escalation, and they're very dangerous when we see increasing encounters at sea and in the air, which might well escalate into open conflict.

But you know, China's threat perceptions as well have not been as a result of this particular administration or even the last administration, but been the result of decades of what it perceives as slights or threats from the United States.

I mean, if we look just a couple of decades back, you know, the 1995 to 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the US says it was an accident. China still does not believe that. In 2001, we saw President Bush talk about how China was a strategic competitor. And in and we saw the EP-3 incident when the United States signals intelligence aircraft actually collided with a Chinese fighter jet off the Chinese island of Hainan.

These successive challenges or threats, followed by then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's declaration that the United States had an interest in freedom of navigation as well as international law in the South China Sea. I mean, I think China has seen all of that as threats to itself. And since then, you know, the first Trump administration, the Biden administration, and the subsequent Trump administration's policies towards China have only confirmed its belief that the United States is out to contain it.

So I think even if we do see temporary retrieve, in terms of trade tensions and a more surface calm in terms of US China relations, I think structurally the relationship is deeply flawed and we are likely to see tensions remain for some time to come.

Mina Al-Oraibi: So, how do you see the US-China rivalry reflecting on how the world governs itself? You know, these are the two great powers. They're both members of the UN Security Council. What we see at the UN Security Council is the rivalry, but of course there's Russia, there's you know there's other dynamics. So as we look at how the world governs itself from the UN Security Council through to the security architecture, if it's a nuclear umbrella for America's allies or bases throughout the world that are shifting as America does its National Defense Review, how does this reflect on global global governance?

Lynn Kuok: I think the US-China rivalry and the sort of the status of the paralysis paralysis that we see in the United UN Security Council has led to countries also seeking parallel, I guess, minilaterals to deal with issues that they are worried about and they have the capacity to work on.

We have these minilaterals in the space of climate action and energy, we have it in in the the realm of economics as well. And in the security space, we also see various minilaterals in the form of say the quadrilateral security dialogue between the United States, Japan, India and Australia, which is a strategic partnership between those various countries that seeks to provide security goods, etc. But also, you know, we have the US, Australia, the UK working on the AUKUS deal, which seeks to promote greater security and defence cooperation and to provide Australia with various nuclear powered submarines in the future.

And so these are all ways I suppose that countries have sought to get around the main security architecture, the United Nations, or to to ensure that their needs are being met.

This doesn't mean of course that the UN is now defunct and completely irrelevant. I think it still has a role to play in terms of ensuring that international law and the global norms provide a unifying source, not just for the likeminded countries, but in terms of competing blocks as well. And I think now with intensifying competition, not between not just between the United States and China, but you know, with Russia, China, North Korea in one bloc and and the so called Western aligned countries in the other bloc, I think you know, the the unifying principles provided by the United Nations are all the more important.

Robin Pomeroy: You don't see the United Nations just disappearing then, or do you see any kind of major reform? I suppose if China and the US have their permanent seat on the Security Council, neither of them particularly have a desire to reform it. But could you imagine ten years from now the United Nations looks very, very different?

Lynn Kuok: I think the United Nations is certainly under pressure and under threat for want of a better word.

The US withdrawal of aid has put increased pressure on already stretched agencies. And of course the US withdrawal from various UN frameworks have also hurt the UN's ability to lead on some of these issues.

China has stepped in to fill some of the gaps, but I think you know that gives the United Nations quite a different complexion, especially since what it has filled the gaps with are very China-centric developments, as for instance a South-South partnership, a UN China South-South partnership.

I think the the other point to make as well is that the US has the UN has been in crisis for some time, even before the the lack of US backing. We've seen it absent from many of the major conflicts in the world, at least in the political and diplomatic sense.

In my part of the world, you know, the United Nations has not played much of a role in terms of the South China Sea dispute, the Taiwan crisis, you know, and more regional issues like the Cambodia-Thailand border crisis as well. And in in other parts of the world, whether it's Gaza or Sudan, you know, it's played an important humanitarian role, but it's been largely absent from the political and diplomatic arena.

So I think it's it's certainly under pressure.

I think in terms of whether or not it can and should be reformed, I think talk about reformation of the United Nations has centred on UN Security Council enlargement to include powers like India, Japan, Brazil, Germany, etc.

But I'm not sure that that enlargement will help with the paralysis that we see as a result of the veto, nor do I see that it will necessarily help in terms of ensuring that the UNSC is more focused on peace and security.

If we look at India's continuation of purchase of oil and gas from Russia, for instance, that's hardly the sort of behaviour that would lead the UN Security Council to enhance peace and stability in our world.

I think perhaps what is needed in the United Nations is less revolutionary or major overhaul, than perhaps a greater degree of strategic discipline and focus, I think, on the things that it should be doing.

And so I think this will require a sort of difficult conversation in terms of where the UN's comparative advantage is. Its mandate right now is quite broad. It's about peace and security, development, human rights, social development. But I think social development, economic development, those are things that take a long time. And progress, it's much more slow in coming. It's important, but it's very slow and coming.

Peace and security is achieving peace and security is equally difficult, but perhaps ceasefire agreements, peace deals, I think that is something, those are wins that the United Nations Security Council or the United Nations as a whole can point to, thereby lifting up its legitimacy and its relevance and thereby making it more easily able to work on some of these other issues that are very important for peace and security, but you know, only the but perhaps the United Nations does not have the capacity to deal with at the moment.

I think what it need to do is to focus on the peace and security piece, but also and then focus on the development piece insofar as it clearly and directly relates to peace and security. That's going to require hard choices and hard decisions, but perhaps it's something that the UN needs to do for the moment at least while it replenishes its stock of legitimacy and relevance.

Robin Pomeroy: I'm going to ask a really naive question, and, Mina, I'd be really interested in your opinion on this from the Middle East perspective.

I grew up during the Cold War when the great power rivalry was very based on ideology. You had clear ideologies, it was capitalism versus communism, and that played out around the world in various different ways.

That's no longer the case. China is a communist country kind of by name, and there are lots of differences in the way China operates, in the way the United States operates.

But, and this is why it's naive, I don't see a massive, massive ideological difference between the United States right now and China right now. And I could be wrong, maybe I'm missing something, because I'm sure people in China or people in the US would say there are massive ideological differences. I just don't see it.

Do you see a massive ideological difference? And if there's not, why does the world seem to need to have two superpowers constantly at each other's throats? Can't there be a time when that's not necessarily the case?

Lynn Kuok: I don't think the cause of US China rivalry is ideological difference. I think calling up ideological differences is a means by which the United States perhaps can rally its domestic populace and also to a certain extent work together with allies who who believe in the values of democracy and and human rights.

So I think it's a means but it's not the cause of the breakdown in relations, which I think is it it has more to do with different interests, competing interests, and to a certain extent who should have a dominant role in Asia or more broadly globally.

I think what we are seeing though is that these ideological differences now, under the Biden administration that we saw accentuated under the Biden administration, have perhaps now faded away. I I don't think this particular US administration is that focused on democracy and human rights. In fact, it has explicitly said to each country his own. I think we saw that in the speech by Secretary Hegseth in summer at a defence dialogue in Singapore.

So I I think there is not where the difference lies.

And in fact, even if we're talking about other differences, actually to many parts of the world, or at least in Asia, there aren't that many differences between the US as it stands today or its behaviour today versus China's behaviour today.

In the past, the United States could rally many countries around the fact that China was flouting international law, was engaging in economic coercion, and that China was a bully. And for many parts of the world at the moment, those very same allegations that the United States was levelling against China may now be levelled against the United States. And I think that's very unfortunate for the United States because for decades the United States was seen not as a perfect power, but as a power that by its willingness to offer up the region a security umbrella or many parts of the world a security umbrella, and by its willingness to engage in free trade, was able to lift many regions of the world up from relative poverty to relative prosperity.

And so I think you know, at least in Asia, that was very much appreciated about the United States. But you know, increasingly I'm hearing comments like, you know, the the differences, there are few and far differences between the US now and what it alleges China's behaviour to be.

Robin Pomeroy: Mina, I know we're asking the questions, but I'd really be interested to to hear, because the Gulf states have relations, important strategic relations with the US, but also China is such an important power. Do you see the ideological differences or you know, how's it viewed right now?

Mina Al-Oraibi: I think many people in the Middle East think the US is now more honest about how it actually behaves.

So the Biden, Obama era of claiming values for many people at the receiving end of the US, be it those who suffered drone strikes under Barack Obama or Biden's decision to withdraw from Afghanistan regardless of what happens to the people of Afghanistan, doesn't really feel like this is the value-based ideology versus China.

Where they do see differences is of course the way of operating and the long view versus the short view.

Short-termism that is imposed by elections in the United States is different than long-termism of China. I think that's where they see the difference of how predictable or unpredictable each each player is. And I think that's the big difference rather than ideology.

And ideology again, you know, the change in even the perception of ideologies is due to the fragmentation of news and information and how societies are informed and therefore the perceptions about these countries. And I think even if either side wanted to play the ideological card, they'd fail because so much more would be discerned and known now as opposed to before how people were informed and the perception of either country. So it is different.

And I think finally, I mean, to really build up on the point of how these countries are interacting with each other and how the rest of the world has to respond to them, less about ideologies, but interests, and that revenge of geopolitics and that revenge of really national interest being front and centre is much more about how people are now seeing it rather than necessarily how countries operate where ultimately it is about national interest and the countries of the Middle East or beyond are really also having to think about where their national interests may meet the interests of one of the two superpowers.

And it's the rise of one empire and slow decline of another empire and it's you know, happened throughout history and I think we're seeing it happening before our eyes.

Robin Pomeroy: We're running out of time. Great, I'm glad I got a question in to you Mina.

Mina Al-Oraibi: Thank you for asking.

Robin Pomeroy: But just one last thing then perhaps. We're always after stories of positive change and there's so much doom and gloom there, Lynn. Is there one thing that gives you hope as we kind of go into 2026? ... That was too long a pause. Where could things get better?

Mina Al-Oraibi: Yeah, what should we be advocating for? What should we try to make?

Robin Pomeroy: Okay.

Mina Al-Oraibi: If you can't find hope, which is...

Lynn Kuok: Well I think where I would look for hope is in both powers, the two most important powers, at the moment for you know shaping our security and economic landscape, for them to recognise that international law, working together with other countries, those are not luxuries or idealistic aspirations.

Those are hard-nosed calculations that adhering to international law and working with other countries as a bigger bloc as opposed to rival blocks, that's what secures your interest, whether in the economic or security domain.

And so I think my hope is that countries are rational about their interests and have more have a broader view of their interests. I don't think it's wrong that countries seek to place their national interests first. You know, President Trump has simply labelled it as making America great again, all countries put their national interest first. I think the difference comes in how narrow or broad a conception you have of your national interest.

And I think what's really important here is that countries understand that international law and multilateral institutions that have secured the peace and prosperity of much of the world thus far is not to be thrown away willy-nilly but to be treasured, promoted and defended at all costs.

Robin Pomeroy: Thank you very much, Lynn. Lynn Kuok of the Brookings Institute. Mina, did you enjoy that?

Mina Al-Oraibi: I did, thank you. We could have gone on for much longer. Thank you Lynn, amazing insights and also great framing of some of the most complex issues that we're facing. So and thank you for the amazing questions, Robin.

Robin Pomeroy: Well, thank you for amazing questions. Yeah, it does feel like, it's such a cliche, but living through history. I mean, it really does feel like it right now.

Anyway, thank you so much, Lynn. Just remains for us to say thank you to our listeners and viewers. This is a video-podcast which you can find on both our websites and on YouTube channels. So you can find Radio Davos wherever you get your podcasts or at wef.ch/podcasts. That's Radio Davos.

Mina Al-Oraibi: And Beyond the Headlines, one of The National's great list of podcasts that you can find on thenationalnews.com and also your preferred choice of podcast providers.

Robin Pomeroy: So thanks for listening and watching and goodbye.